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Commentary
APPOINTMENT OF JUSTICE
MARSHALL ROTHSTEIN TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA©
PETER W. HOGG*
Peter Hogg, a constitutional law scholar, was retained
by the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs to
provide advice to the Ad Hoc Committee to Review a
Nominee for the Supreme Court of Canada as to its
procedures. His account of the public hearing provides
an insider's viewpoint of the historic process
undertaken for the appointment of Justice Rothstein.
His opening remarks to the committee, appended to
this commentary, set out the parameters of questioning
for the hearing, but raise additional questions with
regard to the appropriate limits of judicial speech.
Peter Hogg, sp6cialiste en droit constitutionnel, a 6t6
choisi par le commissaire de la Magistrature f6d6rale
pour conseiller la Commission ad hoc au sujet de ses
proc6dures. Son compte rendu de l'audience publique
expose le point de vue d'un initi6 sur 1'6volution au
cours des temps de la proc6dure appliqu6e pour la
nomination du juge Rothstein. Les remarques
d'introduction au comit6, annex6es aux pr6sentes
observations, d~crivent les param~tres des questions
posses durant l'audience, mais soul~vent des questions
suppl6mentaires concernant les limites appropri6es
des expos6s juridiques.
I. INTRODUCTION
The process for the appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein
to the Supreme Court of Canada in 2006 included the innovation of a
public hearing by an "Ad Hoc Committee to Review a Nominee for the
Supreme Court of Canada." This committee of parliamentarians
interviewed the nominee before his appointment. At the invitation of
the committee, I addressed the committee on the limits of judicial
© 2006, Peter W. Hogg.
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speech. What follows is a description of the background to the
appointment of Justice Rothstein, and a suggestion as to how the
process might be adjusted for future appointments. My remarks to the
committee are appended to this commentary.
II. THE POWER AND PROCESS OF APPOINTMENT
The appointment of judges to the Supreme Court of Canada is
provided for in the Supreme Court Act.' The convention that has
developed for judicial appointments generally is that chief justice
appointments are made on the recommendation of the prime minister
and puisne judge appointments are made on the recommendation of the
minister of justice. In the case of the Supreme Court of Canada,
however, it seems likely that the prime minister is involved in the
appointments.of the puisne judges as well as the chief justice. In the case
of the appointment of Justice Rothstein, Prime Minister Harper made it
clear that, after the public hearing, he was -going to make the final
decision, and he did in fact make the final decision.
Until 2004, no part of the appointment process was public. It
was understood that the minister of justice would consult with the Chief
Justice of Canada, with the attorneys general and chief justices of the
provinces from which the appointment was to be made, and with leading
members of the legal profession, but this was all informal and
confidential.
In 2004, the Honourable Irwin Cotler, who was minister of
justice in the Liberal government of Paul Martin, introduced a more
transparent process to find replacements for retiring Justices Louise
Arbour and Frank Iacobucci. He presented the names of his nominees
for the replacements (Justices Louise Charron and Rosalie Abella) to
the Standing Committee on Justice of the House of Commons, and he
answered questions posed to him by the committee about the search
process and the qualifications of the nominees. After that appearance,
the two nominees were appointed. The nominees themselves did not
appear before the committee.
When the retirement of Justice John Major was announced in
2005, Minister Cotler announced a new and more elaborate process that
'R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 4 provides that appointments are to be made by "the Governor in
Council."
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would be used to fill the vacancy. After the usual informal consultations
with the attorneys general, chief justices, and leading members of the
legal profession, the minister would submit a short list of five to eight
candidates to an advisory committee composed of a member of
parliament (or senator) from each recognized party in the House of
Commons, a nominee of the provincial attorneys general, a nominee of
the provincial law societies, and two prominent Canadians who were
neither lawyers nor judges. The committee would provide the minister
with a short list of three names from which the appointment would be
made. All of this would take place on a confidential basis. However, the
final step would be public: the minister of justice (but not the appointee)
would appear before the Standing Committee on Justice to explain the
selection process and the qualifications of the person selected.
This process was duly commenced to fill the vacancy left by
Justice Major. An appointed advisory committee provided the minister
with a short list of three names. However, on 29 November 2005, before
the final selection was made, the government was defeated in the House
of Commons and Parliament was dissolved for the election that took
place on 23 January 2006. One of the policies of the newly elected
Conservative government was a public, parliamentary interview process
for proposed appointees to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The new Conservative minister of justice, the Honourable Vic
Toews, decided to work from the short list provided by the advisory
committee appointed by the previous government. The prime minister,
no doubt in consultation with the minister of justice, chose one
candidate from that list. That candidate then had to submit to the new
public interview process. With the agreement of all the party leaders,
the government established the Ad Hoc Committee to Review a
Nominee for the Supreme Court of Canada. The committee consisted of
twelve MPs drawn from each party in proportion to their standings in
the House of Commons. The minister of justice, who was one of the
Conservative members, was the chair of the committee. His predecessor,
Irwin Cotler, was one of the Liberal members.
The committee held a televised hearing on Monday, 27 February
2006. The name of the nominee, Justice Marshall Rothstein of the
Federal Court of Appeal, had been made public the previous
2006]
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Wednesday,2 and members of the committee had been supplied with a
dossier which included his curriculum vitae, a list of all of his decisions,
four sample opinions in full, a list of his publications, and four sample
publications in full. The hearing took place from 1:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.
It opened with a short introduction of the nominee and the process by
the chair (the minister), then continued with opening remarks by me,
then with opening remarks by Justice Rothstein, then with questions
from the members of the committee, then with a closing statement by
me and a closing statement by the chair. During the question period,
Justice Rothstein was asked approximately sixty questions in two rounds
of questioning.3
The committee did not prepare a written report. The prime
minister watched the proceedings on television, and no doubt the
minister of justice reported to him. As well, at the conclusion of the
hearing, the minister invited the members of the committee to
communicate their views directly to the prime minister. The result was a
foregone conclusion in that the nominee's credentials, his statement to
the committee, and his answers to questions left no doubt as to his
suitability for appointment, and the reaction of the committee members
left no doubt that they would advise the prime minister to proceed with
the appointment.
Two days after the hearing, the prime minister announced in a
written statement that he had selected the nominee and would
recommend him for appointment by the governor in council. Justice
Rothstein was duly appointed, and was sworn in as a justice of the
Supreme Court of Canada on 6 March 2006.
III. CONDUCTING THE PUBLIC HEARING
I was retained by the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs,
whose office administers the processes of federal judicial appointments,
to provide advice to the ad hoc committee as to its procedures. My
initial thought was that I would prepare a protocol that would limit the
kinds of questions that committee members could ask the nominee, and
2There was an unfortunate leak, duly reported in the media, of the names of the other
short-listed, but unsuccessful, candidates. I discuss this later in this commentary.
' Three questions were asked per member on the first round, and two per member on the
second round. The Committee elected not to continue for a third round.
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that the protocol would be enforced by the committee chair. However,
what emerged from deliberations within the government was the view
that a binding protocol was not the way to go, and that the MPs on the
committee should be free to ask any questions they wanted. This view
was adopted by the committee, which decided that the chair would not
attempt to impose limits on the questions that could be asked. My role
became one of giving guidance to the committee as to the kinds of
questions that could or could not be answered by the nominee. At the
hearing, I made an opening statement to the committee explaining what
its role was and what the appropriate limits of judicial speech were. I
then remained with the nominee at the hearing in case any questions
arose with which I could assist.4
In retrospect, it was the right decision not to impose any limit on
questioning by members of the committee. A protocol enforced by the
chair would have given the impression of a tightly controlled hearing;
this would have annoyed the MPs to say nothing of the audience; and I
think the committee would not have obtained as full a picture of the
nominee. As it was, the questions at the hearing were always civil and
respectful, and Justice Rothstein's courtesy and good humour kept it all
very pleasant. He was adept at handling the questions. Although the
committee members understood the limits of judicial speech, they could
not resist asking some questions on top-of-mind policy issues such as
crime in the cities, gun control, and the elimination of poverty. Each
time, Justice Rothstein acknowledged the validity of the concern and
responded by saying something such as "that's your issue, not mine,"
reminding everyone of the boundaries of questioning. I observed that,
without exception, the questioners seemed perfectly happy with this
response.
IV.. FUTURE HEARINGS
For the future, it would be politically difficult for a federal
government to revert to a wholly confidential process, and I think it
would be a mistake to do so. Certainly, the hearing established that
Canadian parliamentarians can conduct a civil hearing that poses no
danger of politicizing the judiciary or of embarrassing the nominee. It is
4 In fact, I was asked two questions by members of the committee: one on practices in other
Commonwealth countries, the other on the wisdom of a special constitutional court.
2006]
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true that in 2006 the stars were particularly well aligned for a peaceful
hearing since the nominee had been drawn by a Conservative
government from a short list prepared by a committee set up by a
Liberal government and on which all parties were represented. Senate
confirmation hearings in the United States are typically focused on
issues like abortion, and inevitably take on a partisan and rancorous
atmosphere.5 But the political parties in Canada, unlike the Republican
and Democratic parties in the United States, have not defined
themselves primarily by reference to issues that have been decided by
the highest court, such as abortion. Nor have Canadian prime ministers,
unlike American presidents, ever made any effort to pack the highest
court with their supporters.6 Canadian hearings are never likely to
become like the American confirmation hearings.
Canadian hearings are advisory only, since neither the Supreme
Court Act nor the constitution provides any formal role for Parliament.
This lowers the temperature in Canada, because in the end the
government will be able to insist on the appointment of its nominee. In
the United States, by contrast, the constitution requires the
appointment of a Supreme Court justice to be made by the president,
with the advice and consent of the Senate.7 The Senate can block the
appointment, and senators who do not belong to the president's party
have a political incentive to strive mightily to do so. Moreover, in the
United States, unlike Canada, there does not seem to be an
institutionalized process of consultation to ensure that appointments are
always of high quality, so that in some cases there really is legitimate
concern about the quality of a presidential nominee. When this occurs,
s Even so, one observes that strongly qualified nominees are prepared to come forward,
and they handle the difficult proceedings with aplomb.
6 The original court-packing plan was devised by a Democrat, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, to overcome the destruction of his New Deal at the hands of an ultra-conservative
Supreme Court, which believed that measures such as minimum wages or limitations on hours of
work, let alone the New Deal programs to combat the depression of the 1930s, were contrary to the
Bill of Rights. After the swing judge on the nine-man Court changed his mind in 1937, the so-called
Lochner era ended without the implementation of the expansion of the Court that had been
proposed by the President. A period of judicial restraint ensued, but decisions in the 1960s and
1970s on issues such as abortion, contraception, pornography, desecration of the flag, and rights of
criminal defendants raised the ire of conservatives, prompting a new round of hostility to the Court
and open demands for the appointment of more conservative judges.
'U.S. Const. art. II, § 2(2).
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senatorial opposition becomes more bipartisan, and this can lead to the
defeat or (more usually) the withdrawal of the nomination.
The prospect of a public hearing operates as a deterrent to a
government that is considering making a partisan appointment of a
poorly qualified person. This does not seem to be necessary in Canada,
where the diligence of the Government of Canada's routine informal
process of consultation, which has yielded consistently strong
appointments in the past, will undoubtedly continue to yield strong
nominations. Presumably, Canadian federal governments will continue
to believe that it is good politics to make good appointments.
Presumably, as well, governments will not care so intensely about the
decisions of the Court that they will want to influence future decisions
through the appointment process. I have already made the point that
the "wedge issues" in Canadian political debate tend not to be decisions
of the Supreme Court of Canada. As well, we have a weaker form of
judicial review in Canada under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
than the strong form of judicial review in the United States. Judicial
decisions striking down laws on Charter grounds usually leave room for
a legislative response and usually get a legislative response that
accomplishes the objective of the law that was struck down.8 Court
packing and court bashing are not as necessary in Canada as American
politicians perceive them to be in America.
If the impulse to hold public hearings to interview Supreme
Court nominees does not stem from any concerns about the quality of
the people nominated or the suspicion of court-packing motives on the
part of government, what is the basis for it? I think it is really the
democratic notion that important decisions should be transparent.
Based on comments in the press and many comments made to me
personally after the hearing, lay people as well as lawyers were eager to
receive some real information about the work that Supreme Court
judges do. People were curious about the way in which cases come to
the Court, the materials that have to be studied for each case, the
8 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms explicitly permits legislatures to enact
limits on Charterrights (s. 1) and even to use a notwithstanding clause to override Charterrights (s.
33). The common phenomenon of Charter decisions being followed by legislative sequels is the
subject of considerable literature focusing on the idea of "dialogue" between courts and
legislatures. For a recent contribution, see P.W. Hogg, A.A. Bushell Thornton & W.K. Wright,
"Charter Dialogue Revisited-Or Much Ado About Metaphors" (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J.
[forthcoming].
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hearing at which all parties' .arguments are heard and tested, and the
way in which judges try to reach decisions that are faithful to the law and
the facts. The public interview of Justice Rothstein was surely a useful
antidote to the vague charges of judicial activism that float around after
unpopular decisions. It was also interesting to see a judge answer
questions about his career and his work, which sent a reassuring
message about the industry, ability, and integrity of the person who was
about to join the Court.9
People are interested in appointments to the Court. This is
demonstrated by the experience of the existing judges, each of whom on
appointment was bombarded with questions and requests for interviews
by the media. There is much to be said for dealing with this media
interest in the form of a structured public hearing before appointment.
The hearing, which is broadcast on television and reported on by the
print media, is inevitably more thorough and informative than the story
that any one journalist can realistically expect to obtain alone.
In summary, I am in favour of a public hearing by a
parliamentary committee as part of the process of appointing judges to
the Supreme Court of Canada. I think that public hearings will
significantly benefit Canadians by helping them to understand the
appointment process and the judicial function and to learn about the
qualifications of the person nominated for appointment. The retention
of counsel, the development of guidelines as to what can and cannot be
answered by the nominee, and the willingness of committee members to
respect the guidelines are features of the 2006 process that should be
repeated. With these features in place, judicial independence will not be
threatened by public hearings.
V. SCREENING BY AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE
I would make one suggestion for future appointments, and that
is to eliminate the screening of potential appointees to the Supreme
' It is possible to exaggerate the transparency of a process that culminates in a public
hearing. The candidate does not know, and the hearing will not disclose, what considerations
moved the government to choose the candidate over other well-qualified persons. However, each
appointment will have unique elements, and considerations of practicality and confidentiality
probably make it unrealistic for public information to go beyond information about the role of
judges on the Court, the search process, and the qualifications of the particular candidate. And
these, I suggest, are the truly important matters.
[VOL. 44, NO. 3
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Court of Canada by an advisory committee. In my view, there are two
objections to the advisory committee process. The first is that it
compromises what I regard as the desirable principle of executive
appointment. For a single, occasional, high-profile appointment, I do
not think the government should be restricted to a short list developed
by an advisory committee. (Considerations are different for
appointments to courts that have to be made frequently, and are not
going to attract much public notice.) My concern is that the dynamics of
deliberation in a diverse committee may eliminate candidates against
whom some objection can be made. The tendency, I would fear, is that
only the safest and least controversial persons would achieve consensus
in the committee. Such persons are often excellent judges, but may not
always be the best person for the Court at that particular time. Consider
the precedent of Bora Laskin, who was appointed to the Court in 1970
and elevated to chief justice in 1973. His appointment was controversial
because he was the first Jew to be appointed and the first full-time
academic to be appointed. He would probably have been regarded as an
"unsound" candidate by an advisory committee in 1970. And yet, as
Prime Minister Trudeau anticipated at the time, and as is now generally
recognized, he made a more important contribution to the Court than a
person with more conventional credentials might have done. The 1982
appointment of Bertha Wilson, who was the first woman appointed to
the Court, provides another example. My point is that the minister of
justice and prime minister are better able, after informal consultations,
to assess the nature and force of opposition to a candidate and how that
candidate would contribute to the Court, than would a diverse
committee which is seeking consensus.1
A less important objection to the advisory committee screening
process is that too many people are engaged in the selection process,
leading to the risk of leaks that could be embarrassing to the persons
under consideration. This time, the three names that the advisory
committee submitted to the minister of justice were apparently" leaked
to the media. When the name of the nominee was officially announced,
it was obvious who had been rejected. To be sure, it is no disgrace to fail
'o If it were determined to keep the advisory committee at the beginning of the process, its
list should not be binding on government, so that an unusual appointment would not be precluded.
" Neither the minister of justice nor anyone else who was privy to the deliberations of the
committee ever publicly acknowledged that the leaked names were in fact the ones on the short list.
20061
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to receive a Supreme Court appointment, but it is preferable for the
names of the unsuccessful candidates to be kept secret. That is hard to
do if the names and their files have been moved outside the professional
civil service and distributed to an advisory committee that may include
members who are not accustomed to the. constraints of confidentiality in
the face of intense media interest.
If there is some force in these two objections to the advisory
committee process, then it makes little sense to retain the process when
the final nominee is going to be subjected to a public interview process
by a parliamentary committee. Surely, that by itself is a sufficient
guarantee against a poorly qualified or partisan appointment. It seems
to me that executive selection of the candidate (after the normal
informal consultations), followed by a parliamentary interview, followed
by a final executive decision, is the ideal process for those occasional
appointments that have to be made to the Supreme Court of Canada.12
I
12 For other courts, where a steady stream of appointments has to be made, and where
there is little media scrutiny of the appointments, different considerations apply.
[VOL. 44, NO. 3
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APPENDIX
JUDICIAL INTERVIEW PROCESS
Notes for opening remarks to
Ad Hoc Committee to Review a Nominee for the Supreme Court of Canada
By Peter W. Hogg
Reading Room, Centre Block, Parliament Buildings
February 27, 2006
INTRODUCTION
This is an historic moment. It is the first time that a Government nominee for
appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada has been interviewed in public by a committee
composed of Members of Parliament. The purpose of.this new process is to make appointments to
the Court more open, and to promote public knowledge of the judges of the Court.
The process is not without controversy. Everyone would agree in principle that important
public decisions be open and public. But there are those-many of them in the legal profession-
who fear that a parliamentary review of judicial appointments carries more risk than benefit. The
critics argue that an open process will tend to politicize the judiciary, and publicly embarrass the
distinguished people who are nominated for appointment. This Committee, today, has the
opportunity to show the critics that they are wrong. This Committee has the opportunity to
demonstrate that the Canadian virtues of civility and moderation can make an open and public
process work.
ROLE OF COMMITTEE
The authority to make appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada is possessed by
the Governor in Council. That is prescribed in the Supreme Court Act, and that has not been
changed. So this appointment will have to be made by the Governor in Council, which will act on
the advice of the Prime Minister. This Committee is charged with providing advice to the Prime
Minister. He has undertaken to take into account the deliberations and views of the Committee in
deciding whether or not to proceed with the appointment of Mr. Justice Rothstein.
This Committee has the task of interviewing Mr. Justice Rothstein to determine whether
he is well qualified to serve on the Court. It really is a job interview, and like any other job interview
the questions to the candidate should respect both his dignity and his privacy. As well, any
questions put to the candidate should proceed from an understanding of the role that is played by a
judge of the Supreme Court of Canada. I want to say something about that role.
ROLE OF JUDGES
Judges decide cases by finding the facts that are relevant and applying the law to those
facts. In the appeals that reach the Supreme Court of Canada, there is the further complication that
the law itself is usually unclear. That is usually why the case has gone all the way to the highest
court. In that case, the judges have to decide what the law is, as well as how it applies to the facts of
the case.
Before each appeal is heard the judges are required to read and digest a massive amount
of material. They read the decisions of the lower courts that are being appealed, they read at least
some of the transcript of the evidence at trial, they read the decided cases that are arguably
precedents for the case, they read the articles by law professors that bear on the issue, and they
read the factums-the briefs of argument-that are filed by counsel on both sides of the case. And
then, when the appeal is heard, the judges listen to the oral arguments of counsel on both sides, and
they test those arguments by asking questions. Only after carefully considering all of this material,
and weighing the arguments on both sides, are the judges able to reach a decision.
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The Supreme Court of Canada decides about a hundred appeals every year. Each one of
them involves the reading and research that I have just described. And of course the Court has to
reach a decision on each appeal, and then write an opinion. The Court of nine judges is usually
unanimous, but in a minority of cases the Court is divided and one or more dissenting opinions
have to be written. So it is a heavy workload that we require of our Supreme Court judges.
LIMITS ON QUESTIONS
When you think about the role that Mr. Justice Rothstein will be called upon to play if
his nomination is confirmed, it becomes obvious that there are some questions that he cannot be
expected to answer.
He cannot express views on cases or issues that could come before the Court. He cannot
tell you how he would decide a hypothetical case. He might eventually be faced with that case. For
the same reason, he cannot tell you what his views are on controversial issues, such as abortion,
same-sex marriage or secession. Those issues could come to the Court for decision in some factual
context or other. Any public statements about the issues might give the false impression that he had
a settled view on how to decide those cases-without knowing what the facts were, without
reviewing all the legal materials, and without listening to and weighing the arguments on both sides.
Another kind of question that is inappropriate for a judge to answer is the question of
why he decided a particular case in a particular way. Because Justice Rothstein is a sitting judge, he
has written many opinions. These are listed in the dossier that members of the Committee have
been given. Several of the opinions have been included in full as samples. His reasons for decision
in each of those cases are set out in writing. While he can talk in general terms about his work as a
judge, and even about the issues in particular cases, he cannot give an oral explanation of why he
decided a particular case. He has done that in his written opinion. That opinion is a precedent that
lawyers and other judges will rely upon. They should be able to rely on the written opinion, and not
have to hunt down oral explanations by the judges as well. Written opinions are available to all.
Oral explanations are limited to those who hear them.
QUALITIES OF THE NOMINEE
What the members of the Committee can and should do is to satisfy yourselves that this
person has the right stuff to be a judge of the Supreme Court of Canada. Does he have the
professional and personal qualities that will enable him to serve with distinction as a judge on our
highest court? Let me suggest six qualities that you might want to explore in your questioning.
1. He must be able to resolve difficult legal issues, not just by virtue of technical legal skills, but also
with wisdom, fairness, and compassion;
2. He must have the energy and discipline to diligently study the materials that are filed in every
appeal;
3. He must be able to maintain an open mind on every appeal until he has read all the pertinent
material and heard from counsel on both sides;
4. He must always treat the counsel and the litigants who appear before him with patience and
courtesy;
5. He must be able to write opinions that are well written and well reasoned; and
6. He must be able to work cooperatively with his eight colleagues to help produce agreement on
unanimous or majority decisions, and to do his share of the writing.
Ladies and gentlemen of the Committee: If today you find the person with those
qualities, the nation will thank you, and the Prime Minister will have an easy choice ahead of him.
That concludes my remarks.
